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Foreign Corrupt Practices
STUART

H.

DEmING*

Significant developments to deter corrupt practices in the conduct of international'business
took place in both international and domestic fora in 1998. These developments continue the
global momentum in recent years toward the development and implementation of legal regimes
to deter corrupt practices.
I. International Developments
The most noteworthy international developments relate to the implementation of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) and the
Council of Europe's newly adopted Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Criminal Law
Convention).' Though less dramatic, there continued to be developments with the ratification
and implementation of the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (Inter-American Convention)2 and the European Union's Convention on the Fight
Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member
States of the European Convention.'
A. OECD CONVNTION
The OECD Convention entered into force on February 15, 1999. Five of the ten
OECD member countries with the largest export shares deposited their instruments of
*Stuart H. Deming is a partner with Inman Deming LLP in both its Washington, D.C. and Michigan offices.
A former federal prosecutor who served in various capacities with the Department of Justice and Securities and
Exchange Commission, he serves as a Co-Chair of the Section of International Law and Practice's Task Force
on International Standards for Corrupt Practices.
1. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
[hereinafter OECD Convention], OECD/DAFFEIIME/BR(97)16/FINAL(Dec. 18, 1997), repintedin 37 l.L.M.
1 (1998). Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention [hereinafter Criminal Law Convention], (visited Mar.
4, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/englIegaltxt/I73e.htm>.
2. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption [hereinafter Inter-American Convention], OEA/Ser.KI
XXXIV.I, CICORIdoc.14/96 rev.2 (Mar. 29, 1996), repinted in 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996).
3. Internal investigations at the multilateral-lending institutions focused added attention on the implementa-

tion and enforcement of recendy adopted internal measures designed to deter corrupt practices.
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ratification.4 In total, twelve signatories had deposited their instruments of ratification by
the time the OECD Convention entered into force. These countries included Iceland, Japan,
Germany, Hungary, United States, Finland, United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Bulgaria,
Korea, and Greece.! A number of other signatories were expected to ratify the OECD
Convention in early 1999.
The OECD's Working Group on Bribery has initiated follow-up efforts in two critical areas.
One area relates to prohibiting payments made to or through political parties. In its current
form, the OECD Convention does not specifically cover payments to political parties, party
officials, or candidates for political office.' However, the negotiators did agree to an accelerated
work plan to address several outstanding issues, including acts of bribery relating to foreign
political parties and to persons in anticipation of their becoming foreign public officials. 7 The
results of this review will be reported to OECD ministers at the meeting in 1999 of the Council
on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (Council).
The other critical area is instituting procedures to evaluate the degree and adequacy of
implementation of the OECD Convention. The Working Group on Bribery agreed upon a
"rigorous" process of multilateral surveillance to ensure compliance with the OECD Convention
and implementation of the Revised Recommendation of the OECD's Council.' Phase I will
focus on evaluating whether the legal texts through which participants implement the OECD
Convention meet the standard set by the OECD Convention as well as evaluating the initial
steps being taken to implement other parts of the Revised Recommendation. This is to be
completed by April of 2000. Phase II will follow and focus on the performance of countries
that have implemented the OECD Convention.9
B.

CRIMINAL LAW CoNVENTION ON CoRRuprTION

On November 4, 1998, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the
Criminal Law Convention. There were twenty-one European signatories when it was opened
for signature on January 27, 1999.'0 The Criminal Law Convention seeks to coordinate the
criminalization of a wide range of corrupt practices, as well as harmonize national legislation

4. OECD Convention, supra note 1, art. 15, 1. These induded Canada, Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom and the United States, with Canada being the last of the five to deposit its instrument of ratification
on December 17, 1998.

5. The status of ratification and implementation is provided at the OECD's website (visited Mar. 4. 1999)
<http://www.oecd.org//daf/cais/bribery/bibimpe.htm >.

6. This is a narrower category of bribe recipients than under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(aX2)-78dd-2(a)(2) (West 1998). See summary of OECD Ami-tBriby Convention, Joint
Statement of te US. Department of Commerce, US. Department oflustice and US. Departmentof State, at I Uan.
2, 1998) <http://www.com.ita.doc.gov/lega/oecdsum.html>.
7. See id; see also Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
10.
International Business Transactions, OECD/IME/BR(97)17/FINAL,
8. Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions
(Revised Recommendation), OECD/C(97)123/FINAL (May 23, 1997), reprsnte in 36 IL.M. 1016 (1997).
Article VIII called for a "systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full implementation" of the Revised
Recommendation. Aside from setting a time table and reaffirming the need of member countries to criminalize
the bribery of foreign public officials,
9. For a more detailed description of the review process see the OECD's website (visited Mar. 4, 1999)
< http://www.oecd.org//daf/cmis/bribery/bribimpe.htm >.
10. These countries induded Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom, and Georgia.
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and improve international cooperation to facilitate the prosecution of those who offer or accept
bribes.
Any comprehensive analysis of the Criminal Law Convention must await a careful review
of the commentaries associated with its negotiation." But, in general terms, the payment of
bribes to foreign officials is among the prohibitions of the Criminal Law Convention."2 Like
the OECD Convention, bribes to officials of international organizations are also prohibited, 3
and transnational bribery is to be made a predicate offense for purposes of money laundering. 4
But the Criminal Law Convention differs quite dramatically in other ways from the OECD
Convention.
The OECD Convention is a legal regime carefully designed to deter a specific type of conduct.
Each of the signatories agreed to a common set of elements whereby the basic thrust of the
OECD Convention cannot be circumvented through declarations or reservations. Provisions
in the Criminal Law Convention could have this effect." In this regard, there is similarity with
the Inter-American Convention where there isa proviso for signatories to forego implementation
of the transnational bribery and unjust enrichment provisions where either or both would
violate their constitutions and the fundamental principles of their legal systems.' 6
The Criminal Law Convention more closely resembles the Inter-American Convention than
the OECD Convention. Unlike the OECD Convention, it is not limited to bribery in the
conduct of transnational business, and it focuses on both demand and supply-side issues. Unlike
the OECD and Inter-American Conventions, it also extends to commercial bribery and to the
falsification of records. This is not unlike U.S. law where the Travel Act incorporates state
commercial bribery statutes," and where the falsification of records to conceal bribery is
addressed in the record-keeping provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).'"
11. Domestic Developments
The FCPA took on renewed visibility in 1998. Aside from being the first changes in over
ten years, the amendments to the FCPA were the most significant to date. They were accompanied by a series of investigations becoming public in the form of formal charges brought by
the Justice Department.
A. NEw

AMENDMENTS TO THE FoREIGN CoRwpr PRAcricEs

AcT

The United States was a signatory and one of the key moving forces behind the adoption
of the OECD Convention. In May of 1998, the OECD Convention was transmitted to the
11.At a meeting of the Section of International Law and Practice's Task Force on International Standards
for Corrupt Practices on February 4, 1999, a U.S. official reported that the commentaries to the Criminal Law
Convention provide insight that would be helpful to undetanding the resolution of a number of critical issues
by the negotiators.
12. Criminal Law Convention, supra note 1,art. 5.
13. Setid.
art. 9.It also extends to international parliamentary organizations and international courts. Depending upon how an international organization is defined under a signatory's domestic law under the OECD
Convention, the Criminal Law Convention is likely to have a broader application.
14. See id.art. 13.

15. For example, signatories are allowed to declare that bribery of foreign officials is prohibited "only to the
extent that the public official or judge acts or refrains from acting in breach of his duties." Criminal Law Convention,
supra
note 1,art. 36. Reservations arealso permitted for the bribery of foreign public assemblies. See id art. 37,

1.
16. Inter-American Convention, supra note 2, art. VIII-IX.
17. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 (West 1998). Most, but not all, states have commercial bribery statutes.
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(bX2XA) (West 1998).
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U.S. Senate for advice and consent. It was ratified on July 31, 1998." Adoption by the U.S.
Congress of implementing legislation followed which, through amendments to the FCPA,
brought U.S. law into conformance with the terms of the OECD Convention. These amendments were signed into law on November 12, 1998.

1. Expansion of ProhibitedActs
The FCPA previously criminalized payments made to a foreign public official "in obtaining
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person."' Consistent with the
language of the OECD Convention, the amendments expanded the FCPA's scope to include
payments made to public officials for the purpose of "securing any improper advantage."'"
The FCPA will now apply not only to improper payments made to obtain the award of a
contract, but also to payments made to obtain benefits unrelated to the underlying transaction.
But despite this apparent expansion of the law, this change effectively codifies existing policy
and case law followed by U.S. authorities in enforcing the FCPA.
2. Definition of Foreign Public Official
Officials of international organizations are included within the definition of a foreign public
official in the OECD Convention. As a result, the FCPA has been expanded to include any
official or employee of a public international organization, 2 or any person acting on behalf
of a public international organization. 3
3. Scope and luidction
The OECD Convention prohibits illicit payments made by "any person" and recognizes
the application of both the territorial and nationality principles of jurisdiction. Each party is
required to establish jurisdiction over bribery of a foreign public official when the offense is
committed in whole or in part in its territory.24 Where a party applies the nationality principle
of jurisdiction to offenses committed abroad
by its nationals, it must also do so with respect
2
to the bribery of a foreign public official. '
In contrast, the FCPA previously applied to "issuers" and "domestic concerns.

'

Through

19. See 144 CONG. Rac. S9668-01 (daily ed., July 31,1998). The ratification was subject to only one
undermanding which limits the provisions on extradition to only countries in which the United States has a
bilateral extradition treaty in force. Id. And in those instances, the bilateral treaty will serve as the legal basis for
extradition. There were also provisos calling for annual reports over five years as to the status of implementation
and enforcement by other signatories aswell as the status of efforts to limit the tax deductibility of bribes and
of future negotiations to expand the definition of "foreign public official." Id.
20. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(aXl), 78dd-2(aXl) (West 1998).
21. Stv International Anti-Bribery Act of 1998, H.R. Rep. No. 105-802, pt. 3. at 8 (1998) [hereinafter
International Anti-Bribery Act].
22. The public international organizations covered by the FCPA are those organizations designated by Executive Order pursuant to the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 288 (West 1998). It
includes such organizations asthe Organization of American States, the European Space Agency, and the Hong
Kong Economic and Trade Offices.
23. SeeInternational Anti-Bribery Act, supra note 21, at 9.
24. See
OECD Convention, supra
note 1,art. 4, i.
25. See id. 2.
26. The term "issuer" refers to a corporation which has a class of securities registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or isrequired to file reports under the Exchange Act. The term "domestic concern" means
any U.S. citizen, national or resident, and any legal entity which has its principal place of business in the United
States or isincorporated in the United States. This includes any officer, director, employee or agent thereof, or
any stockholder acting on behalf of such entities.
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the requirement that "an instrumentality of interstate commerce" be used in furtherance of
a bribe to a foreign public official, minimal territorial nexus to the United States was necessary
in order for there to be jurisdiction.27 But in practical effect, the scope of the FCPA is limited
to U.S. companies and to U.S. citizens, nationals, and residents. 2" It generally did not apply
to foreign nationals or to foreign corporations and their foreign national employees,29 even if
they committed an act prohibited by the FCPA within U.S. territory.
Under the amendments, the scope of the FCPA is expanded to cover foreign natural and
legal persons that commit any act in furtherance of the bribery of a foreign public official
"while in the territory of the United States." This conforms the FCPA to the OECD Convention
requirement that "any person" who commits all or a part of the prohibited conduct within
the territory of a party should be subject to prosecution by that party. 0
The new amendments expand the jurisdictional basis for prosecution of U.S. companies and
U.S. nationals under the FCPA. It applies the nationality principle of jurisdiction to prohibited
payments made by U.S. nationals or U.S. companies that take place wholly outside of the
United States, regardless of whether an "instrumentality of interstate commerce" is used in
furtherance of the prohibited conduct." With the prior territorial nexus requirement being
minimal, this does not represent a significant change.
This change also mirrors the likely implementation of the OECD Convention in civil law
countries, which tends to use nationality jurisdiction. Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies
have not been covered by the FCPA unless they qualified as issuers. Under the proposed
amendments, they will now be covered to the extent that they act improperly within U.S.
territory.
4. Sanctions
Under the FCPA, foreign national employees and agents of U.S. companies who used an
instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of a prohibited payment to a foreign
public official were subject to civil rather than criminal penalties.32 The amendment to the
27. See15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (West 1998). The term "interstate commerce" covers trade,
commerce, transportation, or communication among the states or between any foreign country and any state.
This would include a telephone call or the transnational use of computers, like e-mail, made in furtherance of
payment or offer to pay to obtain or retain business.
28. The FCPA did apply to foreign nationals who were employees of U.S. companies or foreign nationals
acting as agents for and on behalf of a U.S. company. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (West 1998).
29. Foreign corporations that are "issuers" (i.e., that have ADRs listed on the New York Stock Exchange)
are also subject to the FCPA. Nonetheless, they are less likely to meet the jurisdictional requirement under the FCPA
that there be a use of"an instrumentality of interstate commerce." Yet regardless of whether an instrumentality of
interstate commerce is involved, such entities are subject to the record-keeping requirements of the FCPA. See,
e.g., Montedison, S.p.A., SEC Litigation
Release No. 15164 (Nov. 21, 1996).
30. OECD Convention, supra
note 1, art. 4, 1.
31. While the United States has traditionally followed the territorial principle in the application of its criminal
laws, there is precedent for the application of the nationality principle of jurisdiction under U.S. law. See, e.g.,
the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831-1839 (West 1998) (the statute applies to conduct
outside the United States if the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the
United States, or an organization organized under the laws of the United States); Monetary Transactions Involving
Criminally Derived Products, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(0 (West 1998). ("There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over
the conduct prohibited ... if-(i) the conduct is by a United States citizen...") and § 1957(d) ("the offense
...
takes place outside the United States... but the defendant is a United States person."); s also Foreign
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1998).
32. See International Anti-Bribery Act, supra note 21, Section-by-Section Analysis, § 4 at 5. Previously,
officers and directors of U.S. companies were subject to criminal penalties under the FCPA. 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78dd-2(g) (West 1998).
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penalty section of the FCPA ensures that foreign nationals who are employees or agents of
U.S. companies will be subject to civil and criminal penalties, and thereby accorded the same
treatment as U.S. citizens who are employees or agents of U.S. companies."
5. Implicationsfor US. Companies
The OECD Convention dosely resembles the FCPA. Yet it is generally perceived as being
more narrow in scope. For example, payments to political parties are generally not covered
under the OECD Convention. As a result, for companies that have exercised care to ensure
that they are in compliance with the FCPA, neither the new amendments nor the OECD
Convention should pose a basis for concern. The new amendments essentially follow current
practice in terms of U.S. enforcement activity involving the FCPA.
For companies that have not exercised care in ensuring compliance with the FCPA, the new
amendments and particularly the OECD Convention could have serious implications. The
mutual legal assistance provisions of the OECD Convention will enable U.S. authorities to
acquire evidence that typically was not obtainable in the past. For this reason, regardless of
the degree to which OECD members activdy enforce the OECD Convention, officials with
the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission anticipate an increase in
enforcement activity.
B. ENFORcEMiENT AcrToNs
Although no new enforcement actions were reported by the Securities and Exchange Commission involving the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, a number of new cases were brought by
the Justice Department in 1998. Except for one defendant who remains subject to a pending
extradition request, all of these cases were concluded with the entry of a plea or a conviction.
1. United States v. Saybolt, Inc.
An investigation by the Environmental Protection Agency of allegations of false certifications
of qualitative tests of reformulated gasoline in violation of the Clean Air Act uncovered payments
to Panamanian officials. This involved two Delaware corporations, Saybolt North America,
Inc. (Saybolt North America), and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Saybolt, Inc. (Saybolt), and
two of their officers, Frerik Pluimers, President and Chief Executive Officer of the former and
Chairman of the latter, and David Mead, President and Chief Executive Officer of Saybolt.
A payment of $50,000 was made through Saybolt de Panama to Panamanian officials to
secure a commercially favorable location and a reduced rental tax rate for its operations in
Panama. 34 Mr. Pluimers and Mr. Mead were present when the payment was discussed at a
meeting of the Board of Directors of Saybolt North America at Saybolt's headquarters in New
Jersey." Mr. Pluimers is alleged to have caused the 550,000 to be wired from the Netherlands
to Citibank in New York for Saybolt de Panama's account." In various ways, Mr. Mead acted
as an intermediary to assist Saybolt de Panama in securing the funds for the payment.37
33. Set International Anti-Bribery Act, supra note 21, § 4.
34. United States v. Saybolt, Inc., No. 98 CR 10266 WGY (D.Mass. Aug. 18, 1998). Saybolt de Panama

was incorporated under Panama law and owned by Saybolt International B.V. (Saybolt International), a holding
company incorporated in the Netherlands. Mr. Pluimers was President and Chief Executive Officer of Saybolt
International.

35. See
id. 22.
36. See
id. 30.
37. See id.
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On August 18, 1998, Saybolt North America and Saybolt entered pleas to an information
charging each with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and with violating the anti-bribery provisions
of the FCPA." A fine of $1.5 million was imposed." Mr. Mead and Mr. Pluimers were
indicted on similar charges. However, a third count involving a substantive charge of violating
the Travel Act was added.' Mr. Mead was later tried and convicted on all three counts. Mr.
Pluimers has yet to be tried. He is a citizen of the Netherlands where he continues to reside.
An extradition request against him remains pending there.
Of particular note are the jurisdictional bases for bringing charges against both men. Neither
are US. citizens. His positions with Saybolt North America, Saybolt and Saybolt Western
Hemisphere made Mr. Mead an officer, director, and agent of a "domestic concern" and
therefore subject to the provisions of the FCPA.4 ' But Mr. Mead was also a "domestic concern"
under the terms of other provisions of the FCPA."2 Though Mr. Pluimers was not a resident
alien, he was an officer, director, and agent of a "domestic concern" under the terms of the
FCPA and therefore subject to its terms as an officer and director of Saybolt North America
and Saybolt. 4'
2. United States v. Tannenbaum
Secret payments were offered to an undercover agent posing as an Argentine procurement
officer in United States v. Tannenbaum.44 The payments were made to induce the procurement
officer to take steps to ensure that the government of Argentina would purchase his garbage
incinerators. The investigation ultimately led to the entry of a guilty plea by Mr. Tannenbaum
for conspiracy to violate the FCPA.
3. United States v. Crites
A similar situation was presented in United States v. Crites.4' Through his company, Control
Systems Specialist, Inc., the defendant sought to purchase and recondition surplus military
equipment for resale to Brazil. The sale was to be made to a Brazilian liaison officer located
at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. He was authorized to make purchases on behalf of the
Brazilian Air Force." In exchange for a consulting fee, the Brazilian liaison officer agreed to
approve the purchases on behalf of Brazil.
At the same time, a U.S. civilian representing the U.S. Air Force agreed to provide information
on sources of surplus equipment in exchange for the promise for the payment of money. The
investigation that followed led to pleas being entered to a three-count information by Control
Systems Specialist and its president, Darrold Richard Crites, for conspiracy to violate the FCPA
and to bribe a U.S. official for violating the FCPA and bribing a public official. 7

38. i5 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(aX3) (West 1998). Saybok also later pled guilty to criminal charges of conspiracy
to violate the Clean Air Act by submitting false reports and wire fraud. It agreed to pay a fine of $3.4 million.
39. Sm Saybolt, No. 98 CR 10266 WGY.
40. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(aX3XA) (West 1998).
41. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(hXIXB) (West 1998). United States v. Mead, Indictment at 4 (D.NJ. 1998).
42. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(hXIXA) (West 1998). Mead, Indictment at 5.
43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(hXl)(B) (West 1998). Mead, Indictment at 6.
44. United States v. Tannenbaum, Information (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The government of Argentina gave prior
approval to the Department of Justice to have an undercover agent act as an Argentine official.
45. United States v. Control Systems Specialist, Inc., No. CR-3-98-073 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 1998).
46. He was a "foreign official" under the terms of 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(hX2) (West 1998).
47. 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(cXIXA) (West 1998).
SUMMER 1999

514

C.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
DEPARTMENT OF JusricE OPINIONS

Through its opinion procedure, two new opinions were issued by the Department ofJustice
in 1998. For the first time, the formal procedure did not lead to a conditional approval of a
proposed course of action.
1. FCPA Opinion Procedure Rease 98014
A local Nigerian contractor was retained to help resolve the situation where a U.S. firm
had been found liable for environmental damage caused by its subsidiary. The contractor had
experience in the removal of environmental contaminants and was recommended by Nigerian
environmental officials. He asked that the fine be paid through him and that his fee for the
removal of the contaminants indude "community compensation and modalities for officials
of the Nigerian FEPA and the Nigerian Ports Authority." In a departure from its normal
practice, the Justice Department conduded that an investigation would be commenced if the
U.S. firm made the payments to the contractor.
2. FCPA Opinion Procedure Rekase 98-0249
A wholly owned subsidiary of a U.S. company submitted abid to a foreign government-owned
entity to sell and service military equipment. In connection with its bid, the U.S. company
intended to enter into several agreements with a privately held company in the same foreign
country. The U.S. company had acquired an entity that had an international representative
agreement with the privately held company calling for consulting services to be performed.
Neither the privately held company's nor the entity's owners, officers, employees or agents
were foreign officials.' 0
The international representative agreement with the entity was later terminated after it
was determined to be invalid under local law. A lump sum payment was paid to the entity
after assurances were received that no payment would be made to any governmental official."
The U.S. company thereupon sought to enter into an international representative agreement
with the privately held company in connection with the sale of products and services. It
also sought to enter into a teaming agreement with the privately held company to compete
for government contracts. There would be a monthly retainer and reimbursement for extraordinary expenses.
A new due diligence investigation found there to be no improper conduct nor any ties with
government officials associated with the agreements. An opinion obtained from a law firm in
the foreign country found the agreements to be in compliance with local law. The privately
held company executed a certification, indicating that no one associated with it was a government
official and that no govemment official would directly or indirectly benefit from its entering

48.
49.
50.
51.

FCPA Op. Procedure Release 98-01, U.S. D.OJ. 98-01 (Feb. 23, 1998).
FCPA Op. Procedure Release 98-02, U.S. D.OJ. 98-01 (Aug. 5, 1998).
Seeid
1-2.
As more fully described in the opinion release, the U.S. company undertook extensive measures throughout

the entire process to secure representations and certifications, to undertake further due diligence, and to obtain

independent evaluations and advice. This extended to the termination of the international representation agreement
and to the steps being taken as a prelude to entering into the agreements with the privately held company. See
id.
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into the arrangement. 2 The Department ofJustice indicated that it did not intend to take any
enforcement action with respect to the agreements with the privately held company."
III. Conclusion
Developments in 1998 represented a year of transition. Efforts to deter corrupt practices
in the conduct of international business finally began to make the actual transition from "soft"
to "hard" law. What remains isdetermining whether the momentum will continue and whether
these first definitive steps will lead to broader implementation and active enforcement of the
legal regimes that have been and continue to be developed in various fora. As with the U.S.
experience, the degree to which heightened sensitivity within the legal community and among
major corporations translates into definitive steps being taken to cease past practices will depend
in large part upon active enforcement of these new legal regimes.

52. The privately held company was under obligation to disclose to the U.S. company if circumstances

developed to make any of the certifications in whole or in part inaccurate. See id 9.
53. The U.S. company's obligations under the agreements were "conditioned upon a favorable response
from the Department of Justice under the FCPA Opinion Procedure." See id.
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